This paper investigates when and how the US dollar shortage problem evolved into the full crisis during the financial turmoil that started in the summer of 2007, using cross-currency swap prices between three European currencies (GBP, EUR, and CHF) and USD. We employ the dynamic (latent) common factor model with regime-switching β coefficients proposed by Kim (1994) . The main findings are as follows. There are 2 (high and low) distinctive regimes for β coefficients of each observable price with respect to the common factor. The crisis indicators, particularly US and European financial credit spreads have significant predictive power for regime-switching from and to the high-β crisis regime. The 1-year market first entered the crisis regime soon after the onset of the subprime problem in August 2007, and has stayed in the crisis regime since early March, 2008. The 10-year market shows more gradual and delayed movements of both the common factor and the high-β crisis regime probability, entering the crisis regime soon after the collapse of Bear Sterns in mid-March, 2008.
Introduction
This paper empirically investigates when and how the US dollar shortage problem evolved into the full crisis regime after the financial turmoil started as a problem in the market for the securities backed by sub-prime mortgages in August 2007. To that end, we use cross-currency swap prices between three major European currencies (GBP, EUR, and CHF) and US dollar (USD). A cross-currency swap is typically a contract equal to or longer than 1 year in which two parties borrow and lend the same value of different currencies evaluated at the foreign exchange (FX) spot rate as of the contract date.
A number of financial institutions manage their payments and receipts in an aggregated manner, controlling the maturity profile of their assets and liabilities irrespective of their currency and meeting resultant funding shortages in one currency through cross-currency swaps. The basic premise here is that the cross-currency swap market is highly liquid and resilient, which always enables them to exchange currencies at a fairly low cost. In fact, the growth of cross-currency swaps has been often cited as an important factor promoting the further integration of global financial markets. However, A deterioration in the US subprime mortgage sector, which was just a small segment of US financial markets, quickly spread to other markets, especially those of credit and securitized products (BIS, 2008; IMF, 2008) .
1 Uncertainty about losses increased the liquidity needs of financial institutions as well as their reluctance to lend to each other in inter-bank money markets (Taylor and Williams, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009) . 1 The subprime mortgage-backed securities market accounted for only about 3 percent of US financial assets as of the onset of the problem (Eichengeen et al., 2009 ).
Neither the cross-currency swap nor its shorter-term version, FX swap, was not immune to the financial turmoil. document heightened volatility in those swap markets across several major currency pairs beginning in August 2007. For example, the 3-month FX swap-implied USD rate using European currencies as a funding currency moved quite closely with USD London interbank offered rate (Libor) prior to the emergence of the subprime problem in August 2007. 2 After that, however, the spread between the FX swap-implied USD rates and USD Libor widened considerably, implying a large deviation from the short-term covered interest parity (CIP) condition.
The prices of the longer-term cross-currency basis swap, which should be theoretically equal to 0 if long-term CIP holds perfectly, followed a very similar trend.
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Before the subprime problem came to the surface, they actually moved around 0 or some small constants that possibly reflect minimum transaction costs. Soon after the turmoil started, however, they deviated substantially and persistently from 0, i.e. the long-term currency basis swap market were extraordinary large by its own historical standards, revealing much higher demand for USD funds than European currency funds. and Baba and Packer (2009a) argue that USD liquidity shortages of European financial institutions were among the most important factors behind such developments. The USD shortages largely stemmed from a sharp growth in the USD-denominated assets of European financial institutions over the past decade that sharply outpaced the growth in their retail USD deposits (McGuire and von Peter, 2009 ).
As direct funding from banks and non-banks typically covered only part of such 2 An FX swap is typically a short-term contract in which two parties borrow and lend different currencies simultaneously by combining the FX spot and forward contracts in the reverse direction. The FX swapimplied USD rate is defined as the total cost, in terms of the USD rate, from raising EUR funds in the uncollateralized cash market and converting them into USD funds through the FX swap. See for more details. 3 A cross-currency basis swap is one form of cross-currency swaps that has been most extensively used since the early 1990s. In the case of the EUR/USD pair, during the contract term, the lender/borrower of USD/EUR funds is obliged to pay Euro interbank offered rate (Euribor) plus α basis points every 3 months in exchange for receiving USD Libor flat, where α is the price of the cross-currency basis swap. In this paper, we multiply α by -1 so that a positive value means higher demand for USD funds than European currency funds. See Section 2 for more details.
structural USD shortages, European financial institutions were heavily reliant on the cross-currency swap market to obtain such USD funding. 4 Under these circumstances, soon after the subprime problem emerged in August 2007, European financial institutions attempted to secure USD funding to support US conduits for which they had committed backup liquidity facilities. At the same time, US financial institutions appeared to become significantly more cautious about lending USD liquidity to other institutions in the uncollateralized interbank markets. This is due to heightened counterparty risk, as well as their own need to hoard USD cash on hand.
Facing unfavorable supply and demand conditions and the associated impairment of liquidity in the interbank markets, a large number of European institutions first moved to actively convert European currencies into USD funds through short-term FX swaps, and then used longer-term cross-currency swaps, once they realized that the financial turmoil would last longer than initially thought .
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, as evidenced in Baba and Packer (2009b) , USD-hoarding behavior of US financial institutions amid increased awareness of counterparty risk on a global basis exacerbated the USD shortage problem to a large extent, making dislocations in the cross-currency swap markets even more serious.
To address the USD shortage problem, central banks undertook coordinated efforts to make USD funding more readily available to both US and non-US financial institutions, which were redoubled after the Lehman failure. More specifically, on In this paper, we empirically investigate when and how the USD shortage problem entered the full-fledged crisis regime, using the 1-year and 10-year crosscurrency swap prices for the GBP/USD, EUR/USD, and CHF/USD pairs. We use these currency pairs because financial institutions headquartered in United Kingdom, euro-area, and Switzerland are particularly reported to have suffered from the USD shortage problem. We also focus on the long-term cross-currency swaps rather than the short-term FX swaps for the following 2 reasons: (i) the short-term (say, 3-month) swaps are so close to the epicenter of the crisis that those prices tend to be very noisy and overreact to the headline news and money market conditions and (ii) by full crisis we mean the situation where even the long-term market expectations were affected by the deteriorated market sentiment and liquidity conditions.
We employ the dynamic (latent) common factor model with regime-switching β coefficients proposed by Kim (1994) . This model enables us to decompose the observable price data into (i) the latent common factor, which is supposed to capture the fundamental price reflecting supply-demand imbalances for the USD liquidity that show up in the cross-currency swap market and (ii) regime-switching β coefficients, which is expressed as the probability-weighted average of high and low-regime β coefficients of each observable price with respect to the common factor, as well as (iii) idiosyncratic factors specific to each funding currency.
The use of this model is motivated by the well-established view that (i) the common factor is not observable in most cases and (ii) the sensitivity of observable prices to the (unobservable) common factor can be varied across periods, particularly between tranquil (normal) and stressful times. In times of market stress, market liquidity can be suddenly lost, and subdued risk tolerance tends to govern the wide range of related markets. As argued in Brunnermeire and Pedersen (2008) , impaired funding liquidity can augment the destabilizing effect of reduced market liquidity through the de-leveraging process. At the aggregate level, this process may lead to massive sell-offs across various markets that do not necessarily have a direct link with the market where an initial shock occurred, resulting in much higher commonality across securities (McCulley, 2008) .
In addition, exact dates of such structural changes in the financial markets are unknown a priori in most cases, even though there would be large-scale visible events like the bankruptcy of major institutions. 6 It is due to the fact that market conditions tend to start deteriorating before major events actually occur, and thus market participants may factor in some positive probabilities of such events beforehand. In this regard, it is highly desirable to use the state-dependent regime-switching approach first proposed by Hamilton (1988 Hamilton ( , 1989 .
Furthermore, by comparing the results between 1-year and 10-year cross-currency swaps, we can assess how the crisis sentiment got rooted deeply in the long-term market expectations, in analogy with the expectations hypothesis of the conventional yield curves. We can also formally test whether crisis-related variables significantly triggered or predicted the switch between normal and crisis regimes.
In the literature, several studies test the long-term CIP condition. Using the crosscurrency swap prices up to the early 1990s, Popper (1993) and Taylor (1994, 1996) , among others, find non-negligible deviations from the CIP condition at various times, although such deviations diminished over time. To the best of our knowledge, Baba (2009) is the only study that quantitatively analyzes the recent episode of long-term CIP. As mentioned above, besides the focus on the recent crisis periods, this paper has several novelties, compared to the literature. First, it can explore the latent (unobservable) common factor that is supposed to reflect the fundamental supply-demand imbalances in USD liquidity demand across the 3 currency pairs. Second, it can address the potential regime switches in the sensitivity of each observable price to the common factor. Third, it can investigate the spillover of the crisis sentiment observed in other markets that characterize the recent global crisis well to the cross-currency swap market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the basic structure of the cross-currency swap market. Section 3 describes the model structure and estimation method of the dynamic common factor model with regimeswitching β coefficients. Section 4 presents the main hypotheses to be tested and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 provides the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Basics of cross-currency swap market
A cross-currency swap is a contract in which one party borrows one currency from another party, and simultaneously lends the same value of a second currency evaluated at the FX spot rate as of the contract date to the same party. At maturities equal to or longer than 1 year, cross-currency swaps have been more extensively used and had higher liquidity than the FX swaps in which two parties borrow and lend different currencies simultaneously by combining the FX spot and forward contracts in the reverse direction . Among many other types of cross-currency swaps, the so-called crosscurrency basis swap has become the most liquid instrument since the early 1990s. The parties involved in cross-currency basis swaps tend to be financial institutions, either acting on their own or as agents for non-financial corporations.
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As is the case with the FX swaps, cross-currency basis swaps can be viewed as effectively collateralized contracts, although the collateral does not cover the entire counterparty risk. For example, if the counterparty were to default during the contract period, the party would need to reconstruct the position at the current market price, which entails replacement cost. Duffie and Huang (1996) show that cross-currency swaps are subject to significantly more exposure to counterparty risk than are interest rate swaps, due chiefly to the exchange of notional amounts and higher volatility of underlying asset prices (FX rates).
7 One of the purposes of non-financial corporations for the use of cross-currency basis swaps is to fund their foreign direct investment in foreign currencies. Cross-currency basis swaps have also been used as a tool for converting currencies of liabilities, particularly by issuers of bonds denominated in foreign currencies. These swaps can allow issuers desiring liabilities of a certain currency to access the investor base available in another. Mirroring the tenor of the transactions they are meant to fund, most crosscurrency basis swaps are long-term, generally ranging between one to 30 years in maturity. (
Equation (1) suggests that at least in theory, α should be zero when long-term CIP holds perfectly. Thus, α measures the deviation from long-term CIP observed in the crosscurrency basis swap market. Due to its greater liquidity than that of the FX swap market at maturities equal to or longer than 1 year, the cross-currency swap market is the main source of data for testing the long-term CIP condition. Using the data up to the early 1990s, Popper (1993) , Taylor (1994, 1996) , and Takezawa (1995) find that non-negligible deviations exist from the CIP condition at various times, but that such deviations diminished over time. 9, 10 As far as we know, however, Baba (2009) is the only study that investigates the long-term CIP condition using the cross-currency swap data under the recent financial turmoil.
As is the case with the short-term CIP, for CIP to hold strictly depends on negligible transaction costs, as well as the lack of political risk, counterparty (credit) risk, and liquidity risk (Aliber, 1973 3. Dynamic common factor model with regime-switching β coefficients
Model structure
The model we use in this paper is the so-called dynamic factor model that incorporates 10 In contrast, there is a larger number of studies that investigate short-term CIP. Most of them find that the deviations from short-term CIP have diminished significantly since the 1970s at least among G10 currencies. Despite increasing efficiency in FX markets, however, Taylor (1989) finds that deviations from CIP tend to be evident during periods of uncertainty and turmoil (such occasions as the flotation of sterling in 1972 and inception of the European Monetary System in 1979), and persist for some time. In addition, Akram et al. (2008) investigate deviations from short-term CIP using tick data that covers several months in 2004, and find some economically significant deviations from the CIP condition, albeit relatively shortlived. 11 See Baba et al. (2008) for comparison of the magnitude of dislocations in the cross-currency swap market between the JPY/USD pair in the late 1990s and the EUR/USD pair at early stages of the recent financial turmoil. See also Hanajiri (1999) for the similar analysis for the failure of short-term CIP for the JPY/USD pair in the late 1990s. For analysis of the so-called "Japan premium" per se, see Covrig et al. (2004) and Peek and Rosengren (2001) . Hamilton's (1988 Hamilton's ( , 1989 regime-switching mechanism into a general and highly flexible state-space model with an unobservable latent common factor. 12 This model is first proposed by Kim (1994) , who provides the estimation algorithm for a general form of the model.
In terms of the finance literature, this model enables us to pursue two major goals at the same time: (i) to estimate the latent (unobservable) common factors within a framework of the state space model and (ii) to apply the regime-switch mechanism to sensitivity coefficients of observable prices with respect to the latent factor. As for the first issue, Menkveld et al. (2007) develop a general methodology to study price discovery for cross-listed stocks by estimating the efficient price (fundamental common factor) under the state-space model. Diebold et al. (2008) also propose a state-space model to extract the common factor from yield curves in major countries. 13 In this paper, the common factor is supposed to capture the fundamental price reflecting supplydemand imbalances for USD liquidity against vis-a-vis European currencies emanating from the wide range of institutions operating in the cross-currency swap market of the 3 currency pairs
For the second issue above, Connolly et al. (2005 Connolly et al. ( , 2007 ) use Hamilton's approach to modeling regime switches in the stock-bond and stock-stock return relations, and investigate the role of the VIX (30-day volatility index based on the S&P 500 index) as a potential driver to induce the regime switches. Furthermore, in a more rigorous econometrical setting, Pelletier (2006) proposes the regime-switching dynamic correlation model in which correlation matrix follows a regime-switching mechanism, while volatility process follows the conventional GARCH model.
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In our application to the cross-currency swap prices, the use of the latent factor 12 Hamilton's (1988, 89) regime-switching approach, together with the later developments, is summarized in Hamilton (2005) . 13 In the macroeconomic literature, Gregory et al. (1997) measure the world business cycle from macroeconomic variables of the G7 countries based on the state-space model, for example. 14 Of course, there is large literature applying the regime-switching approach to financial market data in a more general context beyond the application to the regression coefficients or correlation coefficient. For example, Gray (1996) analyzes short-term yields using the regime-switching model. Kim and Nelson (2001) provide a survey of regime-switching model, as well as their application to bond and stock returns. Ang and Bekaert (2002) use the regime-switching model for the analysis of international asset allocation of equity investors.
model is essential because we cannot find any persuasive observable factors that are common across different currency pairs in advance. In the literature, traditional principal component analysis (PCA) is extensively employed to estimate common factors from various financial market data due chiefly to its computational simplicity. 15 It should be noted, however, that the goal of PCA is to extract the factors that maximize the explained variance, but not necessarily the factors that are common across markets. Furthermore, PCA is done by calculating factor loadings of observable market prices on each derived principal factor based on the correlation or covariance between market prices, which is assumed to be fixed during the pre-determined sample periods.
In the real-life world, however, it is far more natural to think that sensitivity coefficients of observable prices with respect to the latent common factor should be varied across periods, particularly between tranquil and stressful times. 16 In times of market stress, market or trading liquidity can be lost suddenly, and subdued risk tolerance, combined with increased concerns of counterparty risk, tends to govern the wide range of related markets. As argued in , impaired funding liquidity can augment the destabilizing effect of impaired market liquidity through the deleveraging process, resulting in much higher commonality across markets. At the aggregate level, in particular, the de-leveraging process may produce massive sell-offs across various markets that do not necessarily have direct link with the market where an initial shock occurred (McCulley, 2008) . The use of the regime-switching approach can address this issue without assuming the dates of structural regime shifts in advance. The state space model is compatible with the regime-switching mechanism, while conventional PCA is not by construction.
In addition, as mentioned in Harvey and Shephard (1993) , under the state space model, the estimate of the unobservable latent factor is updated recursively by means of a filtering process as a new data point becomes available. This process bears a strong resemblance to the real-life market mechanism where new information is being incorporated into the price in a dynamic fashion, once it becomes available to market participants.
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In a nutshell, our model aims to decompose the observable price data into (i) the latent common factor, which is supposed to capture the fundamental price of related markets and (ii) regime-switching coefficients, which is expressed as the probabilityweighted average of high and low-regime β coefficients, as well as (iii) idiosyncratic factors specific to each funding currency. Due perhaps to computational difficulties, however, applications of this kind of model to the high-frequency (say, daily) noisy financial data have seemed to be non-existent thus far to the best of our knowledge. In the macroecnomic literature, on the other hand, Kim and Yoo (1995) 
Here ( ) Following Kim (1994) and Gregory et al. (1997) , the transition equation of the common factor follows the first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process:
The common factor should reflect the general supply-demand imbalances for USD liquidity from financial institutions operating in the market. Here, following Diebold et al. (2008) , we make the following two identifying assumptions. First, we assume that standard deviation of innovations to the common factor is 1 (
) because the magnitude of the common factor and factor loadings ( ) s β are not separately identifiable.
Second, to identify the signs of the common factor and factor loadings, we assume that the GBP/USD loading on the common factor are positive (
) across the regimes without loss of generality. 
where the dependence of each transition probability on the lagged variable 1 − t X is tested using the t-test.
Model estimation

Filtered estimates of common factor
Under a normality assumption for the measurement and transition shocks, we can rely on Gaussian maximum likelihood to estimate unknown parameters by applying the Kalman filter to the above model in state space form.
19 Our primary objective is to form a forecast of t G and its mean squared error based on not only on the current information set 1
but conditional on the current and previous regimes ( t s and 1
Under our model setting of equations (2) and (3), the above equations can be rewritten as
Now, we can define the prediction error ( )
and write its mean squared error
, and
Based on the above, Kalman filtering can be computed by
is the Kalman gain matrix.
Filtered estimates of regime probabilities
As noted by Gordon and Smith (1988) 
Here, relevant regime probability terms can be computed by 
The sample log-likelihood function can be written as
Each unknown parameter is estimated to maximize the log-likelihood function above.
Two main hypotheses
Existence of the common factor
The first hypothesis concerns the common factor. We define the common factor as the factor whose loadings have the same sign across the 3 currency pairs of swap prices. By noting our identifying assumption of 0 > GBP β for both regimes, we can test the existence of the common factor by testing whether all the factor loadings for these 3 pairs have a significantly positive sign based on the t-test.
Crisis indicators as a potential trigger for regime switching
The second hypothesis is whether the variables that closely reflect the recent financial crisis significantly triggered or predicted regime switches in terms of β on the common factor. More specifically, we test whether a larger value of these crisis indicators (more serious state of crisis) is significantly associated with a lower (higher) probability of staying in the low-β regime (shifting from the low-β regime to the high-β regime)
represented by 0 1 > a and a higher (lower) probability of staying in the high-β regime (shifting from the high-β regime to the low-β regime) represented by 0 1 < b in the probability transition matrix (5). Behind this hypothesis lies the above-mentioned observations that in times of market stress, market liquidity and risk tolerance tend to be lost substantially, leading to the large-scale deleveraging process. This arguably makes observable prices more volatile in response to common shocks.
We pick up the following three set of (one-day lagged) variables that are widely In what follows, the cross-currency basis swap price α is multiplied by -1, so that a positive number reflect a higher demand for USD liquidity than each European currency in this market. Also, since the price for GBP/USD is 365-day basis, we convert it into 360-day basis to keep consistency with the prices for other pairs.
Crisis indicators
TED spread
In this paper, the TED spread is defined as the difference between 3-month USD Libor and the rate on the 3-month US Treasury bills. Typically, the TED spread is supposed to capture perceived counterparty risk in the overall banking sector, since US Treasury bills are considered risk-free assets, while Libor is the rate at which Libor-panel banks can borrow. 20, 21 It should be noted that the TED spread also reflects liquidity or flight-to-quality risk, as argued in Eichengreen, et al. (2009) (Brunnermeier et al., 2008, Pan and .
Credit spread indices of financial institutions in the USD and European currency markets
Following the onset of the recent crisis in the summer of 2007, concerns over losses on 20 The Libor fixings are released every business day by the British Bankers' Association (BBA). The Libor fixing is meant to capture the rates paid on unsecured interbank deposits at large, globally active banks. Just prior to 11:00 GMT, the BBA surveys a panel of banks, asking them to provide the rates at which they believe they could borrow reasonable amounts in a particular currency and maturity. 21 Another alternative measure is the 3-month USD Libor-OIS spread, where the OIS (Overnight Index Swap) is an interest rate swap in which the floating leg is linked to a publicly available index of daily overnight rates. The two parties agree to exchange at maturity the difference between interest accrued at the agreed fixed rate and interest accrued through the geometric average of the floating index rate. The USD OIS rate is only available from December 2001, however, so we decided to use the TED spread instead. For details on the Libor-OIS spread, see Taylor and Williams (2009) More specifically, in the analysis that follows, as the counterparty risk measures in the USD market (labeled US credit), we use the first principal component estimated from 2 asset swap spreads of banks and other financial institutions in the USD market, to cover the overall financial sector in the USD market. 24 As for the measures in the European currency markets (labeled EU credit), this index series has EUR and GBP categories, so we use the first principal component estimated from 4 asset swap spreads of banks and other financial institutions in the EUR and GBP markets, respectively.
23 Qualifying securities must have at least 1-year remaining maturity, a fixed coupon schedule, and a minimum amount outstanding of $250 million. 24 An asset swap is a synthetic derivative security that can be viewed as a portfolio consisting of a fixedrate bond and an interest-rate swap of the same notional amount that pays a fixed rate and receives a floating rate, say Libor, to the stated maturity of the underlying fixed-rate bond (Duffie and Singleton, 2003) . Asset swap spreads are often used as benchmarks for CDS pricing. (Figures 1 and 2 ). One notable difference across the 3 pairs is a relatively small maximum value and standard deviation for the CHF/USD pair.
Empirical results
Summary statistics
The 1-year maturity has a larger maximum value and standard deviation than 10-year maturity irrespective of the currency pairs.
Next, each crisis indicator has a large standard deviation, reaching extraordinary high values under the recent crisis, particularly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Table ( 1), Figure 3 ). In the analysis that follows, we use the logarithm of these indicators following Connolly et al. (2005 Connolly et al. ( , 2007 . 25 To facilitate comparison across indicators, we use the standardized (log) series of each variable with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation, as shown in Figure 4 . Table 1 (2) shows correlation matrices between variables. Cross-currency basis swap prices show a very high correlation for both 1-year and 10-year maturities, suggesting the existence of the common factor. Correlations between crisis indicators are also high, particularly between credit spreads, which supports our use of the first principal components from spreads.
Estimation results
Table 2 (1) shows the parameter estimates for the 1-year cross-currency swaps, where a single crisis indicator is included. 26 We also estimate the baseline model without a crisis indicator. First of all, very similar estimates are obtained for the regime-dependent coefficients β across the 3 currency pairs throughout the models. In regime 0, β coefficients are in the relatively narrow range of 0.129-0.181 across the 3 pairs, while in regime 1, they are in the wider range of 3.082-5.838. All the β coefficients in both regimes are significantly positive. This result indicates the existence of the common factor for both regimes. In both regimes, β coefficients are the smallest for the CHF/USD pair. In regime 0 (1), the GBP/USD (EUR/USD) pair has the largest β coefficient. The result of the high-β regime may reflect the nature of the USD shortage problem in that Euro-area financial institutions were affected most heavily by the problem and Swiss financial institutions were hit the least of these 3 currency zones.
Furthermore, we find that these 2 regimes are quite different from each other: β coefficients in regime 1 are about 25 times larger than those in regime 0 for the GBP/USD and the CHF/USD pairs, and about 40 times larger for the EUR/USD pair.
This implies that the periods classified as regime 1 correspond to the crisis period during which market liquidity is lost substantially and deteriorated risk tolerance governs the whole market, resulting in much higher sensitivity of the observable prices to the common factor.
Second, AR(1) coefficient κ of the common factor is estimated to be very close to 1. 27 This result suggests that the estimated common factor follows a (near) randomwalk process, although to test it rigorously is beyond the scope of this paper. But, we may be able to say that the common factor is close to the efficient price in that realized changes in prices observed in informationally efficient markets cannot be forecasted given the current information set (Samuelson, 1965) .
Third, each regime is found to be very persistent. The estimation result of the (2006) . However, robust measures are still unavailable for the state-space models with time-varying latent factors like ours. That said, we also estimated 1 and 3 regime models and found the following. (i) The conventional LR test favors the models with a larger number of regimes (in the order of 3, 2, and 1 regimes).
(ii) 2 of the 3 estimated sets of β coefficients from the 3 regime-switching model are quite similar to the high-regime set of β coefficients from the 2 regime-switching model, resulting in difficulty interpreting the 3-regime results in economic terms, while the estimated sets of β coefficients are quite different between 1 and 2 regime models. Therefore, we chose 2 regime-switching model in this paper. 27 The similar result is obtained in Diebold et, al (2008) , who extract the common factor from yield curves in major countries. indicator is associated with a significantly lower (higher) probability of staying in regime 0 (shifting from regime 0 to regime 1). On the other hand, only US and European financial credit spreads have a significant effect on the probability of (high-β ) regime 1
: a higher value of these variables is associated with a significantly higher (lower) probability of staying in regime 1 (shifting from regime 1 to regime 0).
Furthermore, the LR test result shows that all these variables except for VIX induce a significant increase in predictive power compared to the baseline model. This result strongly confirms our second hypotheses that a deeper state of crisis or more stressful market environment triggered or predicted the regime switching between the low-and high-β regimes significantly. Table 2 (2) reports the periods of the high-β regime identified by the filtered probability, where we simply use 0.5 as the cut-off value for each regime. Here, we find very similar dates across the models. In each model, the 1-year cross-currency swap later that led to the near collapse of Bear Sterns in mid-March (Fender and Hördahl, 2008) . Figure 5 shows the filtered series of the (standardized) common factor and high-β regime probability estimated from the model including TED and European credit spread with the highest log-likelihood. 30, 31 The common factor exhibits a large jump around mid-August in 2007, just before the regime shifts to the high-β regime (endAugust). This jump in the common factor coincides with the fact that European financial institutions began to secure USD funding to support US conduits for which they had committed backup liquidity facilities around this time. It has another distinctive surge in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, 2008. It peaked on October 8, soon after which (on October 13), the central bank community resorted to an extraordinary measure of permitting the ECB, SNB, BOE, and BOJ to provide their eligible counterparties with unlimited access to USD liquidity in response to market conditions. As of the end of our sample period (July 31, 2009), the common factor returned to the level that prevailed before the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Next, Table 4 shows the estimation results for the 10-year cross-currency swaps.
First, similar to the 1-year results, we can detect 2 distinctive regimes in the β coefficients. One important difference is that β for the CHF/USD pair in regime 0 is not significantly different from 0, while in regime 1, every currency pair has a significantly positive β . This result suggests that under normal conditions (regime 0), the common factor does not exist across these 3 currency pairs, but when the market is under stress (regime 1), commonality is significantly enhanced across the 3 pairs, evidenced by the existence of the common factor. It should be noted, however, that the relative difference in β between the high and low regimes is much smaller in the 10year case than in the 1-year case, albeit still large in absolute terms: ( ) for VIX again has a significant effect on the transition probability of regime 0 ( ( )
while only European credit spread has a significant effect on regime 1 probability
. The LR test result shows that all these variables induce a significant increase in predictive power compared to the baseline model without a crisis indicator. This result confirms our second hypothesis about the role of the crisis indicators in the regime switches of the sensitivity coefficient on the common factor. Table 4 (2) reports the periods of the high-β regime. One notable difference from the 1-year case is that the 10-year market experienced several short periods of the high-β regime in the early days of EUR, particularly from 2000 through 2003, during which the value of EUR was quite unstable against other major currencies. One possible interpretation for this result is that market liquidity may be lower in the 10-year crosscurrency swap market than the 1-year market, so market conditions are more susceptible to the instability of EUR and other disturbances. Under the recent financial crisis, the market first entered the high-β regime in late-March, 2008, soon after the collapse of Bear Sterns. Then, after a few short periods, the market has stayed in that regime since end-May.
32 Table 5 shows the results in the 2-indicator case. 33 Unlike the 1-year case, every combination of crisis indicators except for that of TED spread and VIX is found to be insignificant judging from the LR test (Table 5 (1)). The periods of the high-β regime identified by the filtered probability (Table 5 (2)) are very similar to those in the 1-indicator case. Figure 6 shows the filtered series of the (standardized) common factor and high-β regime probability based on the model with the European credit spread. with an insight about how the crisis took root deeply in the long-term expectations of the cross-currency swap market. The longer the maturity is, the more gradual and delayed the movements of the common factor and high-β regime probability are. Intuitively, this 32 The US Federal Reserve-facilitated takeover of Bear Sterns by JPMorgan was generally perceived by investors as signaling that large banks would not be allowed to fail, and this helped restore order in a wide rage of markets. However, the speed with which Bear Stern's access to market liquidity had collapsed underscored the vulnerability of other financial institutions, which kept interbank money market under extreme stress due to heightened counterparty risk and liquidity concerns (Fender and Hördahl, 2008) . 33 As in the 1-year case, we impose relevant constraints on the coefficients of each indicator. 34 The reason for this choice is that only the model with the European credit spread has significant coefficients on both 00 P and 11 P .
result can be well understood such that market participants turned from shorter-term USD funding to longer-term funding, once they realize that the financial crisis would last longer than initially thought .
Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated when and how the USD shortage problem evolved into the full crisis during the financial turmoil that started as a relatively small problem of subprime debt securities market in the summer of 2007. We used the price data of the cross-currency swap market between three major European currencies (GBP, EUR, and CHF) and USD. The cross-currency swap market is extensively relied upon by a number of European financial institutions to meet shortages in one currency, resulting from managing their payments and receipts in an aggregated manner, controlling the maturity profile of their assets and liabilities irrespective of their currency.
In this paper, we employed the dynamic common (latent) factor model with regime-switching β coefficients proposed by Kim (1994) . The main findings can be High-beta regime probability
Common factor
The filtered estimators are based on the estimation result of the model using the TED spread and European financial credit spread as crisis indicators reported in Table 3 . The common factor is a standardized series with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. High-beta regime probability
The filtered estimators are based on the estimation result of the model using the Euroepan credit spread as a crisis indicator reported in Table 4 . The common factor is a standardized series with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. The basis swap prices are multiplied by -1 after converted into the 360-day basis from the 365-day basis in the case of GBP/USD pair.
(2) Correlation matrix The correlation matrix in Panel B is based on the variables in logarithmic form. US credit and EU credit refer to the first principal components estimated from logarithm of relevant spreads. See text for more details. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The LR test is the chi-squared statistics based on the likelihood ratio test of each model with a crisis indicator against the baseline model. The variance of the latent common factor is set to 1. The basis swap prices (measured in basis points) are multiplied by -1 after converted into the 360-day basis from the 365-day basis for the GBP/USD pair.
(2) Periods of high-β regime identified by filtered probability The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The LR test is the chi-squared statistics based on the likelihood ratio test of each model with two crisis indicators against the model with higher log likelihood in the single-indicator case. The variance of the latent common factor is set to 1. The basis swap prices (measured in basis points) are multiplied by -1 after converted into the 360-day basis from the 365-day basis for the GBP/USD pair.
(2) Periods of high-β regime identified by filtered probability The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The LR test is the chi-squared statistics based on the likelihood ratio test of each model with a crisis indicator against the baseline model. The variance of the latent common factor is set to 1. The basis swap prices (measured in basis points) are multiplied by -1 after converted into the 360-day basis from the 365-day basis for the GBP/USD pair. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The LR test is the chi-squared statistics based on the likelihood ratio test of each model with two crisis indicators against the model with higher log likelihood in the single-indicator case. The variance of the latent common factor is set to 1. The basis swap prices (measured in basis points) are multiplied by -1 after converted into the 360-day basis from the 365-day basis for the GBP/USD pair.
(2) Periods of high-β regime identified by filtered probability 
